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THE INCREASING POLITICIZATION OF THE AMERICAN
JUDICIARY: REPUBLICAN PARTY OF MINNESOTA v. WHITE
AND ITS EFFECTS ON FUTURE JUDICIAL SELECTION IN
STATE COURTS*
INTRODUCTION
The Framers of the United States Constitution structured America's federal
government intending the judiciary to be the weakest and most impartial of the three
branches: it was designed to have little impact on the manner in which the country
was run.' As time passed, the American judiciary has strayed further and further
from that ideal. No longer is it possible to view the judiciary in the way it was
conceived. The rise of "judicial activism" has expanded significantly the power of
judges. Interpretation is no longer the judge's sole function - the line separating
adjudicator and legislator has been blurred. As the relative strength of the branch
has increased markedly, judicial selection has become a vital aspect of American
politics.
In some states, the line has been blurred even further. Whereas the federal
government utilizes the nomination/confirmation process as its method ofjudicial
selection, the majority of states prefer popular election for the selection of at least
some levels ofjudges.2 This method of selection presents an apparent contradiction
by thrusting judges, designed to serve in a position of impartiality, into the role of
common politician.
Increasingly, politicians and voters nominate or elect judges based on their
ideologies, providing seats with the purpose of fulfilling a political agenda. One
cannot imagine that the Framers envisioned judicial candidates campaigning for
office or the prospect of citizens voting in partisan elections to select candidates for
the bench. The American judiciary has become increasingly politicized in recent
decades, and unless the government takes measures to slow this trend, America runs
the risk of completely deviating from the initial purpose of the judicial branch.
This Note will examine the increasing politicization of the American judiciary,
specifically addressing the selection process and the problems the method of
election has presented for state courts and will present in the future. The discussion
occurs in the wake of the June 2002 decision of the Supreme Court in Republican
* I would like to extend my gratitude to Professor Kathryn Urbonya, C. Keanin Loomis,
and Christopher Seacord for their assistance in reviewing this article. I would especially like
to thank Nicole Lillibridge for her editing as well as for her assistance in selecting this topic.
See infra notes 7-11 and accompanying text.
2 See infra note 4.
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Party of Minnesota v. White,3 which, despite only concerning state judges in a
jurisdiction where they are elected officials, promises to have a large impact on the
entire judicial system.
This Note begins by providing a brief history of the American judiciary, for the
purpose of discussing the Framers' intent with respect to separation of powers. The
first section establishes a historical basis from which to compare the legal system
as it appears today. The discussion then shifts to a brief survey of contemporary
problems, touching on federal selection methods, but concentrating primarily on the
issue of judicial selection by election - the process employed for selecting
supreme court justices in twenty-one states.' Following the background, Part Ill
presents a thorough analysis of the White decision and what this decision means for
the future of judicial selection. This section argues that the holding in White helps
to further politicize the judicial selection process. Part IV examines White's
aftermath, revealing a trend in the courts toward an expansion of the majority's
holding. Part V provides recommendations for changing and improving judicial
selection methods for state courts, addressing ways to decrease political influence
on the selection process.
By allowingjudges to "announce" theirpolitical beliefs duringjudicial election
campaigns, the Court in White has significantly eroded the credibility of the
American judicial process.5 The granting of increased free-speech rights for
candidates threatens the very core ofthejudiciary. If states continue to electjudges,
in the wake of the White decision, the judicial system runs the risk of complete
compromise. The original purpose of the judicial branch is no longer being served
and a slippery slope has begun. Judicial and political elections and offices are
fundamentally different and must be treated as such. States must modify their
judicial selection procedures to reflect the true role ofthejudiciary and to lessen the
increasing effects of politicization.
I. BACKGROUND
Judicial independence means that judges are free to decide cases fairly
and impartially, relying only on the facts and the law. It means that
judges are protected from political pressure, legislative pressure, special
interest pressure, media pressure, public pressure, financial pressure or
even personal pressure.
536 U.S. 765 (2002).
4 AM. JUDICATURE SOC'Y, JUDICIAL SELECTION METHODS IN THE STATES (2003), at
http://www.ajs.org/selection/sel state-select-map.asp [hereinafter JUDICIAL SELECTION
MEMODS].
5 See White, 536 U.S. at 765.
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Judicial independence goes back to the U.S. Constitution. Our country's
founders, and each state's founders, worked to protect courts from undue
pressure. They knew that it takes fair and impartial decisions to protect
our rights - and uphold rule of law.6
A. The Framers' View of the Judicial Branch
In order to advance an argument concerning the flawed nature of the judicial
selection process, one must examine how the Framers viewed the structure of the
government which they were creating. Examining the Federalist papers helps to
reveal their intent. Madison wrote:
One of the principal objections inculcated by the more respectable
adversaries to the Constitution, is its supposed violation of the political
maxim, that the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments ought
to be separate and distinct. In the structure of the federal government,
no regard, it is said, seems to have been paid to this essential precaution
in favor of liberty. The several departments of power are distributed and
blended in such a manner as at once to destroy all symmetry and beauty
of form, and to expose some of the essential parts of the edifice to the
danger of being crushed by the disproportionate weight of other parts.
No political truth is certainly of greater intrinsic value, or is stamped
with the authority of more enlightened patrons of liberty, than that on
which the objection is founded.7
More importantly for this Note, however, are Alexander Hamilton's words in
The Federalist 78, discussing the judicial branch and how the Framers viewed its
structure and responsibility.' Hamilton argued for a system of selection that
required appointment and granted judges tenure for life "to secure a steady, upright,
and impartial administration of the laws." 9 He stressed that the judiciary is the
weakest branch and should have very little impact on the governing of the country:
6 JUSTICE AT STAKE CAMPAIGN, WHY JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE MATrERS (2002), at
http://www.justiceatstake.org/contentViewer.asp?breadcrumb=2.
7 THEFEDERALISTNO. 47 (James Madison) (Project Gutenberg ed., 1996), available at
http://memory.loc.gov/const/fed/fed_47.html.
I THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (Project Gutenberg ed., 1996),
available at http://memory.loc.gov/const/fed/fed_78.html.
9 Id.
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The judiciary, on the contrary, has no influence over either the sword or
the purse; no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the
society; and can take no active resolution whatever. It may truly be said
to have neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment; and must
ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy
of its judgments.'°
The Framers had no intention of allowing any part of the judiciary to become a
political office, nor did they anticipate judges being nominated to satisfy a political
agenda. The main principles governing the judicial branch were impartiality and
separation from political influence.
As early as the 1830s, however, scholars made observations concerning the
American judicial system which revealed signs ofpolitical influence. The remarks
of Alexis de Toqueville clearly foreshadowed the future of the branch:
What a foreigner understands only with the greatest difficulty in the
United States is the judicial organization. There is so to speak no
political event in which he does not hear the authority of the judge
invoked; and he naturally concludes that in the United States the judge
is one of the prime political powers."
B. Nomination, Confirmation, and Selection as It Exists Today
Whereas all federal judges must go through a nomination and confirmation
process, states have no uniform method of judicial selection. The issue of state-
judge selection procedures is a widely debated one, especially considering that
some states choose to fill their judicial offices through popular elections. Twenty-
one states elect judges at all levels and eleven others elect their lower court judges.'2
10 Id.
1 ALExIs DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 93 (Harvey C. Mansfield & Delba
Winthrop eds., Univ. of Chi. Press 2000) (1835).
12 See JUDICIAL SELECTION METHODS, supra note 4. The twenty-one states that elect
judges at all levels are Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. The eleven states
that have lower court judges elected are Arizona, California, Florida, Indiana, Kansas,
Maryland, Missouri, New York, Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Tennessee. States which have
appointment procedures forjudicial selection commonly have uncontested retention elections
after their initial appointments. ONLINE MEDIA Krr, FACT SHEET ON JUDICIAL SELECTION
METHODS IN THE STATES (2002), at http://www.manningproductions.com/ABA245/OMK/
factsheet.html.
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Six states have partisan elections for judges at all levels,13 which raises concerns
regarding the increasing role of political parties in the judicial system. Regardless
of which selection form one examines, there are many critics, and criticism has
grown due to the marked increase in power the courts have realized in recent
decades. Political influence has greatly impacted the courts at both federal and state
levels.
The selection process for federal judges, while conducted via the seemingly
innocuous appointment process, appears increasingly politically charged with each
passing year. Thomas Jipping argues that the selection process for federal judges
is more about securing a politician's legacy than appointing competent judges. 4
His sentiments are echoed by John Ferejohn, who agrees that courts have become
politicized, "making judicial decisions appear to be politically motivated and
making appointments to the bench matters of partisan contention ... .-" These
points are particularly true in the period following Judge Bork's rejection by the
Senate. "The Bork proceedings clearly established a firm precedent for ideological
inquiries and for the rejection of judicial nominees, at least in some instances, on
purely ideological grounds."' 6
While the problems with federal judicial selection methods stem from political
influence, the method of judicial election creates the problem of transforming
judges into politicians. Nicholas Wallwork, president of the state bar of Arizona,
argues that "[e]lection of judges . . . requires judicial electioneering and
13 Id. (noting that these states are Alabama, Illinois, Louisiana, North Carolina,
Pennsylvania, and Texas).
"4 Thomas L. Jipping, From Least Dangerous Branch to Most Profound Legacy: The
High Stakes in Judicial Selection, 4 TEX. REv. L. & POL. 365 (2000). In this piece, Jipping
discusses the reasoning behind the growing politicization of the judiciary, tailoring his
argument to address the high number of vacancies in the federal court system. Id. He argues
that judicial activism and the changing philosophy ofjudges is the major contributor to this
increased politicization. Id. In his opinion, a president's "most profound legacy" are his
judicial nominees, because increasingly, "judges ignore the law." Id. at 458. He goes on to
state that the real issue should be judicial philosophy rather than selection; modern judicial
philosophy is making the judiciary the most dangerous branch. Id. at 382. Jipping ultimately
determines that the confirmation process as it exists today is "geared toward confirming
nominees no matter what their judicial philosophy might be." Id. at459. His argumentshould
not go unnoticed.
15 John Ferejohn, JudicializingPolitics, Politicizing Law, 65 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS.
41, 66 (2002). Ferejohn is quite critical of the legislative role that judges have undertaken
in recent decades. He opines that the judicial selection procedure, combined with life tenure,
are concepts fundamentally incompatible with the restraint necessary to have a wholly
effective judiciary that adheres to the purpose for which it was designed. Id. at 41. He
proposes many reforms forjudicial selection and the operation of the judicial branch that will
be discussed later in this note. See infra notes 173-77 and accompanying text.
16 NORMAND VIEIRA & LEONARD GROSS, SUPREME COURTAPPOINTMENTS: JUDGE BORK
AND THE POLITICIZATION OF SENATE CONFIRMATIONS 247 (1998).
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politicization of courts, giving rise to unseemly impressions of justice for sale."' 7
Judges necessarily perform the same functions as other candidates for elected
office. This role does not mesh with the ideals of the judicial branch. "[A] system
of elected judges produces outcomes necessarily at odds with the goal of the ABA
Model Code of Judicial Conduct: an independent judiciary that avoids the
appearance of impropriety."' 8
In recent decades, many scholars, including judges, have begun to realize that
many of the issues traditionally left to politicians are now being decided by state
supreme court justices. As a result, elections for these offices look no different than
elections for other public offices. 19 "Separating the judiciary from the other
branches of government means little ifjudges are then subjected directly to the very
same pressures that caused us to mistrust executive and legislative influence in the
first place. 20 Political parties, public interest groups, and the media now have a
maj or influence over who gets elected to an office that was originally created on the
basis of at least an appearance of impartiality."
In the wake of increasing politicization of state courts, the financing ofjudicial
election campaigns has also become a major issue. "In 2000, [state] [s]upreme
[c]ourt candidates raised more than $45 million - a 61% increase over 1998, and
double the amount raised in 1994. In Mississippi, [in 2002] special interests and
candidates spent almost four times as much on TV campaign ads - $390,000 -
as they did in 2000.22 In Nevada, judges may even make political contributions to
"7 Nicholas J. Wallwork, A Strong, Independent Judiciary, ARIZ. ATT'Y, Mar. 2002, at
6 (arguing, based on the effectiveness of Arizona's judicial selection system, that merit
selection is a far superior method for achieving a strong, independent judiciary).
" John D. Fabian, Note, The Paradox of Elected Judges: Tension in the American
Judicial System, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 155, 155 (2001) (arguing that judicial elections
are incompatible with the concept of an independent judiciary).
19 Paul J. De Muniz, Politicizing State Judicial Elections: A Threat to Judicial
Independence, 38 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 367, 368 (2002).
20 John A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary:
Institutionalizing Judicial Restraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 969 (2002).
21 See Anthony Champagne, Interest Groups and Judicial Elections, 34 LOY. L.A. L.
REv. 1391, 1393 (2001) (arguing strongly against the increasing role that interest groups are
playing in judicial elections and opining that interest group involvement "challenges the
appearance ofjudicial impartiality"); Anthony Champagne, Political Parties and Judicial
Elections, 34 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 1411, 1426-27 (2001) (stating while political parties
perform many necessary functions in judicial elections, partisanship has a negative overall
impact on the judicial system by keeping qualified judges out of office and pushing judicial
candidates into taking extreme positions on certain issues); Joseph D. Kearney & Howard
B. Eisenberg, The Print Media and Judicial Elections: Some Case Studies From Wisconsin,
85 MARQ. L. REv. 593 (2002) (focusing on the role of the media in states with judicial
election systems).
22 JUSTICE AT STAKE CAMPAIGN, SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN DECRIES SPECIAL INTEREST
INFLUENCE ON JUDICIAL CAMPAIGNS (2002), at http://faircourts.org/files/McCainPress
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judicial candidates! 23 These findings demonstrate that political parties and special
interest groups significantly influence judicial elections. At a minimum, these
instances compromise the appearance of impartiality. "According to the poll
conducted by Harris Interactive, 72 percent of Americans are concerned that the
impartiality of judges is compromised by their need to raise campaign money. 2 4
The increasing influence of interest groups and political parties appears to
contradict the ideal of judicial impartiality.
The Supreme Court's holding in White appears to have further compounded the
problems surrounding judicial elections. White, in effect, allows justices running
for elected judicial positions to behave like normal politicians by discussing their
views on political and legal issues, despite the fact that the judicial branch is
predicated upon independence and impartiality. This decision, while directly
applying only to states, promises to have widespread effects, which will not only
compromise judicial elections, but the entire judicial selection process.
II. REPUBLICAN PARTY OF MINNESOTA V. WHITE
A. Facts and Background
In June of 2002, the Supreme Court invalidated a section of the Minnesota Code
of Judicial Conduct, known as the "Announce Clause," via a fractured five-to-four
decision that produced five separate opinions.2" A group challenged this statute on
First Amendment grounds, arguing that prohibiting candidates from announcing
Release.pdf.
23 Philip W. Bartlett, Propriety ofa Judge MakingPolitical Contributions to Judicial and
Non-Judicial Candidates, NEv. LAWYER, Sept. 2002, at 33 ("No judge or judicial candidate
may contribute an amount subject to public disclosure.") However, if the amount is below
the threshold for public disclosure, money can be given. Id.
24 ONLINE MEDIA KIT, POLL: CONFIDENCE IN JUDICIARY ERODED BY JUDGES' NEED TO
RAISE CAMPAIGN MONEY (2002), at http://manningproductions.com/ABA245/OMIrelease.
html.
2' Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002). In addition to the majority
opinion, two concurrences, by Justices Kennedy and O'Connor, and two dissents, by Justices
Stevens and Ginsburg, were authored. Id. It is noteworthy that the majority opinion makes
no attempt to distinguish the "Announce Clause" from another section of the statute known
as a "Pledges or Promises" clause, "which separately prohibits judicial candidates from
making 'pledges or promises of conduct in office other than the faithful and impartial
performance of duties in office."' Id. at 770. As there was no challenge to the Pledges or
Promises Clause, since all parties agreed that this clause was within the scope of the
government's power, the majority simply did not address the issue. Id.
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their views on disputed legal and political issues violated their right to free speech. 6
The statute formerly stated:
A candidate for ajudicial office, including an incumbent judge ... shall
not .. make pledges or promises of conduct in office other than the
faithful and impartial performance of the duties of the office; announce
his or her views on disputed legal or political issues; or misrepresent his
or her identity, qualifications, present position or other fact, or those of
the opponent .. .27
Minnesota has had elections forjudges since the state's admission to the union,
but only in the past two decades were candidates bound by the Announce Clause,
which carried penalties as harsh as disbarment for violators.2" The legislature
enacted this statute as an attempt to preserve the actual impartiality and the
appearance of impartiality of the state judiciary.29 According to the Supreme Court,
however, this justification for the statute's enactment was not compelling enough,
as the Court ruled in favor of those seeking to invalidate the statute and held that the
Announce Clause violated the First Amendment free-speech rights of judicial
candidates.3"
B. White's Majority Opinion
In analyzing the case, Justice Scalia, author of the majority opinion, agreed with
the court of appeals that the proper test to decide the constitutionality of a statute
that burdens First Amendment freedoms was the strict scrutiny test.3' Under this
test, proponents of the statute were required to prove that the Clause was narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling state interest.32 The state's assertion that impartiality
was a compelling interest did not meet the heavy burden of strict scrutiny.
Scalia strongly criticized the impartiality argument and attacked it through an
examination of various definitions of the term "impartiality." He began by using
the traditional definition" and reached the conclusion that because the statements
the Announce Clause prohibited concern issues and not parties, there was no bias,
26 Id. at 769-70.
27 52 MINN. STAT. ANN., CODEOFJUDICIALCONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(I) (West 1995).
23 White, 536 U.S. at 768.
29 Id. at 735.
30 Id. at 774-76, 788.
31 Id. at 774-75.
32 Id. at 775.
3 Id. at 776. Scalia states that the traditional definition of impartiality in the legal sense
is "the lack of bias for or against eitherparty to the proceeding." Id. at 775.
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and thus, no compelling state interest in prohibiting the speech. 4 Justice Scalia
admitted that disadvantaged parties who file suit and present an issue on which the
judge announced his contrary views while campaigning will probably lose. 5
However, Scalia reasoned that because the judge will apply the law the same way
to any party that brings a case on that particular issue, no partiality toward a
particular party exists. 6 This appears to be a flawed line of reasoning. If a judge
announces his views on a legal issue he clearly does have a bias - a bias against
all parties that present cases contrary to that position, regardless of the facts of the
case.
Justice Scalia then discussed impartiality by defining it as bias toward a
particular legal issue. He quickly discounted this line of rationale as serving a
compelling state interest, and therefore failing to meet the burden of strict scrutiny.
Scalia explained that while the Announce Clause might serve a state interest, "[a]
judge's lack of predisposition regarding the relevant legal issues in a case has never
been thought a necessary component of equal justice... it is virtually impossible
to find a judge that does not have preconceptions about the law." ' While this may
be true, it still appears problematic that judges are allowed to campaign on a
platform of deciding all relevant cases in the same way.
The majority opinion next discussed the third definition of impartiality -open-
mindedness. The Court rejected this definition, however, opining that the
Announce Clause was not adopted in pursuit of that ideal. 9 The majority held
steadfastly to the idea that all judges have preconceived notions of cases, and
communicating those ideas in campaigns is no different than in judicial opinions or
authored books. 40 Scalia continued by pointing out that judicial elections are still
elections, despite the fact that they are not for political office, and thus voters must
have a means of comparing candidates.4' Justice Scalia devoted the remaining
portion of his opinion to challenging the dissent's assertions in favor of the
Announce Clause.
Justice O'Connor, in her concurrence, focused almost entirely on the method
that Minnesota, as well as other states, used to select its judges.42 Interestingly, she
pointed out that "[i]f the State has a problem with judicial impartiality, it is largely
one the State brought upon itself, by continuing the practice of popularly electing
' White, 536 U.S. at 776.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 776-77.
'7 Id. at 777.
3 Id. at 778.
39 id.
41 Id. at 779.
41 Id. at781-82.
4 Id. at 788-92 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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judges. 43 Justice O'Connor appeared to be suggesting that another method of
judicial selection might be preferable to the current election-based system espoused
by Minnesota."
C. The White Dissenters
Justice Stevens's dissent attacked the majority opinion for having "two
seriously flawed premises - an inaccurate appraisal of the importance of judicial
independence and impartiality, and an assumption that judicial candidates should
have the same freedom 'to express themselves on matters of current public
importance' as do all other elected officials." '45 Stevens expressed his belief that a
judge is quite different from other elected officials in that "issues of law or fact
should not be determined by popular vote; it is the business of judges to be
indifferent to unpopularity.""
Justice Stevens's opinion appeared more concerned with a dislike for the
process of electing judges than it was with the particular facts of the case. To
Stevens, the election ofjudges was fundamentally incompatible with the process of
fairly deciding cases. However, if elections were a necessary evil in Minnesota, the
Announce Clause was sufficiently narrowly tailored to serve the interest of
impartiality because statements made by judicial candidates were statements made
against individual parties.47 Stevens added that the Announce Clause served a
compelling state interest because the statements were "uniquely destructive of open-
mindedness." ' Allowing candidates for judicial office to make politically charged
statements in their campaign for office destroys the fundamental fairness of the
judiciary. Justice Stevens concluded that "[e]lections to judicial office should not
mirror rules governing political elections." 9
Justice Ginsburg's dissent' also offered a far more detailed opinion than that
of the majority. She argued that "[wihether state or federal, elected or appointed,
41 Id. at 792 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
' For more arguments concerning appropriate forms of state judicial selection, see
Stephen C. Aldrich, Minnesota Judicial Elections: Better than the "Missouri Plan, "BENCH
& B. MINN., Oct. 2002, at 27; Mark A. Behrens & Cary Silverman, The Case for Adopting
Appointive Judicial Selection Systems For State Court Judges, I CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 273 (2002); Federalist Society, Judicial Selection White Papers: The Case for
JudicialAppointments, 33 U. TOL. L. REv. 353 (2002).
45 White, 536 U.S. at 797 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting language from the majority
opinion at 781-82).
46 Id. at 798 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
47 Id. at 800-01 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
41 Id. at 806 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting the majority at 781).
49 Id. at 803 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
" Justice Ginsberg also joined in Justice Stevens's dissent.
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judges perform a function fundamentally different from that of people's elected
representatives. Legislative and executive officials act on behalf of the voters who
placed them in office; 'judge[s] represen[t] the Law."'' Justice Ginsburg was very
interested in establishing the difference between the two offices, and she too
appeared to take issue with the election of officials for judicial office. Ifjudges are
to be elected, however, states do have an interest in preserving judicial integrity
through speech restrictions.5 2 Statutes similar to Minnesota's Announce Clause
were a very effective way in states with an election method ofjudicial selection, to
preserve judicial integrity, which is clearly a compelling state interest. 5
Justice Ginsburg's dissent frst attacked the majority's assertion that the
Announce Clause must fail because the process is, by definition, an election.
However, elections for political office are vastly different than elections for an
office whose goal is to administer justice.' Judges do not serve the people in the
same way that other politicians do. They, at least by design, should not represent
factions or constituencies. Justice Ginsburg stated, "The balance the State sought
to achieve - allowing people to elect judges, but safeguarding the process so that
the integrity of the judiciary would not be compromised - should encounter no
First Amendment shoal.""
Justice Ginsburg stressed that the text of the statute included language that
limited its scope, making it narrowly tailored.' This language did not restrict
statements of views on legal questions, but rather only how disputed issues would
be decided. 7 Judicial campaign speech can be limited in ways that would not be
allowed in elections for political office because of the type of work that judges
perform." This statute did not completely limit the speech of a judicial candidate,
it only limited the types of speech that would compromise the integrity of the
judicial branch.
Justice Ginsburg also discussed the pledges and promises section of the
Minnesota statute and the vital state interests that provision served with respect to
its interaction with the Announce Clause. 9 Justice Ginsburg stated, "All parties to
this case agree that, whatever the validity of the Announce Clause, the State may
constitutionally prohibit judicial candidates from pledging or promising certain
results ... [pledges or promises are] inconsistent with 'the judge's obligation to
s' White, 536 U.S. at 803 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
52 Id. at 804-05 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 806 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
s4 Id. at 805 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
5' Id. at 808-09 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
56 Id. at 809 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
5 Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
5 Id. at 813 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
5 Id. at 812 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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decide cases in accordance with his or her role." 60 This prohibition was justified
through the "State's interest in preserving public faith in the bench."6'
If the Court viewed the pledges and promises Clause as so justified, how then
was the Announce Clause different? As Justice Ginsburg explained, "[t]he
Announce Clause, however, is equally vital to achieving these compelling ends, for
without it, the pledges or promises provision would be feeble, an arid form, a matter
ofno real inportance.6Z Without the Announce Clause, candidates can completely
circumvent the prohibition on pledges or promises. A candidate would still be able
to "promise" his constituents how he would decide a certain legal issue, thus
revealing a bias toward an entire class of cases.
In her conclusion, Justice Ginsburg addressed the problems posed by the
process of electing officials for judicial office. She believed that they could be
solved, however, by allowing the state to institute measures to restrict the speech
of candidates:
Judges are not politicians, and the First Amendment does not require that
they be treated as politicians simply because they are chosen by popular
vote. Nor does the First Amendment command States that wish to
promote the integrity of their judges in fact and appearance to abandon
systems of judicial selection that the people, in the exercise of their
sovereign prerogatives, have devised.63
Ginsburg thus concluded that the constitutional interests of elected judges and
judicial integrity are effectively balanced under the prescriptions of the Announce
Clause.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Free Speech of Judicial Candidates
Before analyzing the Rhite decision and its implications for the judicial
selection process and the overall politicization of the judiciary, it is first necessary
to address the issue of free speech for judicial candidates generally. Despite the
impact the White case will have on the judicial system, this case is centered on First
Amendment issues. If the state wishes to restrict the speech of these candidates, it
must first demonstrate that a compelling reason exists for doing so. In this author's
0White, 536 U.S. at 813 (citation omitted).
61 Id. at 818 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
62 Id. at 819 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
63 Id. at 821 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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opinion, the impartiality of the judiciary is a strong enough justification for speech
regulation, but the free-speech rights of judges also must be discussed.
Two vital issues must be addressed when discussing the free-speech rights of
judicial candidates. The first- and most problematic for proponents of restrictions
on judicial candidate speech - is that judges must be considered elected officials
and should be afforded all of the rights of a political candidate in the states using
judicial elections. The second issue - and most useful to speech restriction
proponents - is that judges perform a function vastly different than those who are
elected to other public offices. Judges are not meant to serve their constituents in
the same way.
The First Amendment issues raised by judicial elections have been addressed
by several scholars. Robert Berness opined, "the very fact that judicial candidates
are popularly elected makes the selection process political. One of the First
Amendment's principal functions is to protect political speech, and as a result, any
regulation of political speech runs squarely against the First Amendment."* Others
have taken an even stronger stance. Professor Erwin Chemerinsky succinctly wrote,
"Government-imposed, content-based restrictions on the speech of political
candidates, in virtually any circumstance, are unconstitutional." '6  Professor
Chemerinsky argued that these First Amendment issues are a consequence of states
using election as the method of choosingjudges; if states decide that electing judges
is the preferred selection method, they should be prepared to afford the candidates
the same political freedoms as those running for political office." While his points
are well taken, the problem remains that candidates for judicial office are inherently
different than candidates for political office. As such, there should be instances
when the government can restrict the speech of judicial candidates in order to
protect against the degradation of judicial office to the status of partisan politician.
There are opportunities for the government to circumvent the First Amendment
prohibition against speech restrictions. The barrier that must be met, however, is
4 Robert C. Bemess, Note, Norms ofJudicialBehavior: Understanding Restrictions on
Judicial Candidate Speech in the Age of Attack Politics, 53 RUTGERS L. REv. 1027, 1038
(2001).
6' Erwin Chemerinsky, Restrictions on the Speech of Judicial Candidates Are
Unconstitutional, 35 IND. L. REv. 735, 735 (2002).
" Id. Chemerinsky emphasizes that judicial elections are problematic and that "[t]here
is an inherent tension between judicial elections and judicial independence ..... Id. Despite
his distaste for judicial elections, he opposes free-speech restrictions on judicial candidates,
such as the rule at issue in White. Chemerinsky simply argues that if an election is to occur,
all rights should be afforded to the candidates. He concludes that "judicial elections make
judges and judicial candidates politicians .... [T]he First Amendment protects their right to
express their views.... If this stance is objectionable, the solution should be to reconsider
how we elect judges, rather than silencing their voices." Id. at 746. The issue of whether
judicial elections are a proper method of judicial selection will be discussed later in this
Note.
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quite high. Judicial candidate speech may not be restricted unless the restrictions
survive the burden of scrutiny afforded political speech. 7 "[T]he government must
demonstrate a compelling interest, and that the restriction on speech be narrowly
tailored."' Recent cases, including White, reveal that even when states show a
compelling interest, the vast majority of speech restrictions will fail.69 In these
cases, the courts largely ignore the importance ofjudicial speech restrictions.
Judicial-candidate speech restrictions are essential as norms of social
behavior.7" These restrictions serve important functions and, without them, the line
separating thejudiciary and other elected branches of government would be blurred.
This was never the intention of the Framers. One commentator explained, "[T]he
qualities that differentiate the judiciary from the political branches of government
require a stricter set of standards for judicial campaigns than other political
campaigns."' This assertion should be of the highest importance when considering
speech restrictions for judicial candidates.
The increased hostility toward restriction of judicial-candidate speech is in
itself telling of the increased politicization of the American judiciary.72 When
looking at this hostility and the judicial campaigns themselves, it is necessary to
keep in mind the function that a victorious candidate would perform. The free-
speech rights of the candidate, therefore, are not the only issue requiring
consideration. Thus, judges are not typical political candidates and there is far more
at stake in a judicial, as compared to a political, election. In judicial elections,
"substantially greater emphasis [must be given] to the paramount value of ensuring
due process in our system ofjustice. ' 73
Traditionally, state governments offer far fewer interests in defense of their
speech restrictions than are available, overlooking many others that require
protection. Arguments should not simply be limited to judicial integrity and public
confidence in the judiciary.74 "[Iln most cases [dealing with judicial election
speech] courts have failed to recognize that the goal of the Canon is to protect the
67 Bemess, supra note 64, at 1038.
61 Id. at 1040.
69 Id. at 1040-51 (discussing In re Chmura, 608 N.W.2d 31 (2000), cert. denied, 531
U.S. 828 (2000), Weaver v. Bonner, 114 F. Supp. 2d 1337 (N.D. Ga. 2000), Butler v. Ala.
Judicial Inquiry Comm'n, 802 So.2d 207 (Ala. 2001)).
70 Id. at 1057.
71 Id. at 1061.
7 Robert M. O'Neil, The Canons in the Courts: Recent First Amendment Rulings, 35
IND. L. REV. 701 (2002).
" Id. at 702.
74 Id. at 722-23.
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right to a fair trial."" This due-process-based claim is a much stronger argument
in favor ofjudicial candidate speech restriction." As one scholar framed the issue,
"What is at stake here is no less than the promise of fairness, impartiality, and
ultimately of due process for those whose lives and fortunes depend upon judges
being selected by means that are not fully subject to the vagaries of American
politics."77
B. White Deconstructed
When broken down, Justice Scalia's reasoning in the majority's opinion appears
quite similar to Erwin Chemerinsky's argument in his article, Restrictions on the
Speech ofJudicial Candidates Are Unconstitutional." Scalia's argument, that there
was no compelling interest that can withstand First Amendment strict scrutiny when
dealing with restriction of this type of preelection candidate speech - which he
deems to be "election-nullifying" - leaves little to be scrutinized." It is a concise
and strong opinion, based directly on the text of the First Amendment. This is a
stance that is very tough to counter, if one believes that judicial and political
elections are in fact similar.
Justice Scalia failed to give credence to the difference in judges' roles versus
those of other government actors, which make speech restrictions necessary if
judges are selected through popular election.8" He did not utilize precedent that
specifically addresses the role of judges and the judiciary. Both dissenting
opinions, by contrast, used several prior opinions to demonstrate why the Announce
Clause is necessary. Scalia's majority opinion is flawed, and a thorough
examination of the dissenting opinions, particularly Justice Ginsburg's, will reveal
why.
Justice Stevens makes a number of points that properly challenge the Court's
holding. Most importantly, he speaks of the popular vote and reelection:
" Id. at 716 (quoting Max Mizner, Gagged but Not Bound: The Ineffectiveness of the
Rules Governing Judicial Campaign Speech, 68 U. OF MO. AT KAN. CrrY L. REv. 209,228
(1999)).
76 id.
77 Id. at 723.
8 See Chemerinsky, supra note 65, at 735.
7' Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 782 (2002).
lo Id. Justice Scalia makes a very interesting point when addressing the Ginsburg dissent.
He states that "[i]f, as Justice GINSBURG claims, it violates due process for a judge to sit
in a case in which ruling one way rather than another increases his prospects for reelection,
then - quite simply - the practice of electing judges is itself a violation of due process."
Id. He immediately rejects that without properly addressing it. The validity of the election
ofjudges is not a point that should be overlooked when discussing this issue.
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The elected... judge does not serve a constituency while holding that
office. He has a duty to uphold the law and to follow the dictates of the
Constitution.... [H]e has an obligation to follow the precedent of that
court, not his personal views or public opinion polls. He may make
common law, but judged on the merits of individual cases, not as a
mandate from the voters."'
Statements made in order to entice a voting population to elect ajudge to office
are in direct contrast to the very purpose of that office. Statements made to voters
should not dictate the way that the law is decided. It is for this reason that
Minnesota has a compelling interest in sanctioning statements that reveal a potential
judge's view on a legal issue likely to come before him. 2
Judges should not reveal closed-mindedness in order to win a seat that is
defined by impartiality and objective decision making. In Justice Stevens's words,
"the very purpose of most statements prohibited by the Announce Clause is to
convey the message that the candidate's mind is not open on a particular issue." 3
Judicial decisions should not be politically influenced. By campaigning on a
political platform rather than merit, this ideal is compromised. As Justice Stevens
explained, "While the problem of individual bias is usually cured through recusal,
no such mechanism can overcome the appearance of institutional partiality that may
arise from judiciary involvement in the making of policy. The legitimacy of the
Judicial Branch ultimately depends on its reputation for impartiality and
nonpartisanship." s4 Justice Stevens's comments, while quite important, tend to
address the problem of judicial election as much as they address the Announce
Clause. For this reason, it is necessary to analyze Justice Ginsburg's dissent to
properly counter the majority's argument.
The crux of Justice Ginsburg's argument is the same as previously discussed8 5
- that judges perform a vastly different function than those elected in other
political races and are not supposed to cater to specific constituencies. 6 Most
importantly, the potential judge should never have a personal interest in any of the
cases which he is to decide. 7 By stating his views on a certain issue to be decided
at a later date, the judge has a personal interest in the outcome: a legitimate concern
that he will not be reelected if he contradicts his previously stated views. Justice
s" Id. at 799 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
82 Id. at 799-801 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
83 Id. at 801 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
14 Id. at 802 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Misretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361
(1989)).
85 See supra notes 54-61 and accompanying text.
86 White, 536 U.S. at 803-04 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
87 Id. at 814.
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Ginsburg cited numerous cases in her dissent which support this argument, but the
majority completely disregarded these decisions."8
In discussing the appropriate role of elected state judges, Justice Ginsburg used
the majority opinion in Chisom v. Roemer.9 This case began to shed light on the
inherent problem of elected judges, and demonstrated why speech restrictions are
necessary. In Chisom, the Court stated that "ideally[,] public opinion should be
irrelevant to the judge's role because the judge is often called upon to disregard,
even to defy, popular sentiment."'* The Framers understood this and thus sheltered
judges by having them appointed rather than elected, and by granting them life
terms.91 However, in a system where judges are elected by popular vote, they do
represent a voting population.92 That is precisely why it is necessary to keep
candidates from stating views on disputed political and legal topics. Judges should
not feel pressure to decide cases based on statements made during a campaign.
Limiting these statements allows judges to at least maintain an aura of impartiality.
The strength of Justice Ginsburg's dissent followed from the aforementioned
ideal. Ifa judge has any interest in the outcome of a case, due process is violated.93
Many cases have been decided based on this notion,9' and it is difficult to
understand why the majority chose not to give weight to this issue, or recognize that
statements made by ajudicial candidate on particular legal or political issues could,
in some instances, lead to compromised impartiality. An impartial judicial
proceeding is one of the major tenets on which our judicial system rests. All
litigants have a "powerful and independent constitutional interest in [a] fair
adjudicative procedure.""5 This principle uniquely implicates the role of judges:
"no man is permitted to try cases where he has an interest in the outcome."96
To further define the term "interest" as it applies to judicial proceedings, Justice
Ginsburg cited a number of cases, three of which, in particular, warrant
examination. 7 In Tumey v. Ohio, the majority held that if a judge has "direct
pecuniary interest in the outcome" or if he has an "official motive" that is not within
88 See, e.g., Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813 (1986); Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc.,
446 U.S. 238 (1980); Ward v. Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972); In Re Murchison, 349 U.S.
133 (1955); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
89 501 U.S. 380 (1991).
90 Id. at 400.
9s Id. at 401.
92 id.
9' White, 536 U.S. at 814 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
'9 See, e.g., Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813 (1986); Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc.,
446 U.S. 238,243 (1980); Ward v. Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972); In re Murchison, 349
U.S. 133, 136 (1955); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
9' White, 536 U.S. at 813 (quoting Marshall, 446 U.S. at 243).
96 Id. at 814 (citing Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136).
97 See id. at 814-17 (discussing Aetna, 475 U.S. at 813; Ward, 409 U.S. at 57; Tumey,
273 U.S. at 510.
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the scope of judicial proceedings, the judge must be disqualified.98 The Court,
adhering to the general principle that "officers acting in a judicial or quasi-judicial
capacity are disqualified by their interest in the controversy .... ."9 held that if a
judge received a stipend only when a defendant was convicted, the proceeding
could not be regarded as satisfying the requirement of due process of law. 00
The test that the Court articulated in Tumey is whether the judge is in a situation
which would "offer a possible temptation to the average man as a judge to forget
the burden of proof required to convict the defendant, or which might lead him not
to hold the balance nice, clear and true between the state and the accused.. 0
This holding was extended in Ward v. Monroeville.02 Based on the test set forth
in Tumey, the Court held that a judge, who was also the mayor, violated the
defendant's due process rights by presiding over a case where the fine collected
would go to support the city's finances. 3 While not as direct an interest as in
Tumey, responsibility for the city's finances was enough of an interest to disqualify
the judge because the judge performed "two practically and seriously inconsistent
positions, one partisan and the other judicial, [which] necessarily involves a lack of
due process.... "'I
Most recently, the Court examined the issue of judicial interest in Aetna Life
Insurance Co. v. Lavoie.' Here, a state supreme court justice had a case pending
against him in a lower court on a similar legal issue as was being decided in a case
that he was adjudicating."° As the holding of the state supreme court would be
binding on the lower court, the U.S. Supreme Court decided that this judge was
acting as "a judge in his own case."'0 7 His opinion for the court had "the clear and
immediate effect of enhancing both the legal status and the settlement value of his
own case."' 08 Aetna is important because it expanded the scope of the term
"interest." "It mattered not whether the justice was actually influenced by this
interest; '[t]he Due Process Clause,' we observed, 'may sometimes bar trial by
judges who have no actual bias and who would do their very best to weigh the
scales ofjustice equally between contending parties."° 9 There appears to be no
98 273 U.S. at 535.
99 Id. at 522.
'0o Id. at 531.
'0 Id. at 532.
102 409 U.S. 57 (1972).
103 Id.
'04 Id. at 60.
'0s 475 U.S. 813 (1986).
106 Id.
107 Id. at 824.
108 Id.
109 Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 815 (2002) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (citation omitted) (quoting Aetna, 475 U.S. at 825).
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question that the mere appearance of impartiality should be a compelling interest
in the restriction of judicial campaign speech, a view supported by precedent.
Justice Ginsburg relied on these decisions as the primary authority to frame her
dissenting opinion in White. A correlation easily can be drawn between campaign
statements and future interest in the outcome of cases. It is difficult to imagine that
a judge would not, under any circumstance, have a direct and pecuniary interest in
the outcome of a case that was tried on a disputed legal issue about which he spoke
during his campaign. In making such a statement, a judicial candidate has
effectively gone on the record in support of a particular legal or political position.
While a statement in support of a disputed legal or political issue is not technically
a promise or pledge, which the states are allowed to regulate through speech
restrictions, it does not follow that these types of statements are not construed as
such by the voting population."0 Whether influenced by his future campaign for
reelection or motivated to maintain an image of integrity and consistency by
adhering to campaign statements, an elected judge will be interested in the outcome
of his cases. Based on this reasoning, the state clearly has a compelling interest in
restricting the speech of judicial candidates: guarding against the absence of
impartiality in judicial decision making.
C. Election of Judges: A Viable Method of State Judicial Selection?
A major issue indirectly raised by the White decision and directly addressed by
many scholars in the area of judicial selection is the viability of popular elections
as a means of judicial selection. This issue has an incredibly large impact on
judicial independence. The concept of judicial elections appears fundamentally
opposed to the notions of judicial impartiality and independence. Even members
of the Supreme Court that sided with the majority in White agreed that there is a
fundamental tension between the election of judges and the American judiciary."'
Is the election of judges inappropriate? While it might not be unconstitutional to
elect judges, the process poses many problems. If the process cannot be eliminated,
it must be changed to preserve the integrity of the American judiciary. "[T]he first
two canons of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct mandate that a judge should
uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary and avoid impropriety and
the appearance of impropriety in all of the judge's activities."' 12 However, "[w]ith
each passing election, public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
courts falls lower"'. 3
"'0 Id. at 820 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
.. Id. at 790-91 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that popular election of judges
undermines the public confidence in the judiciary).
1 Fabian, supra note 18, at 155 (citation omitted).
" Behrens & Silverman, supra note 44, at 313.
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Public opinion is not the only negative aspect of this trend; there are significant
legal concerns as well. "[1In any state with partisan judicial elections, stare decisis
can be less significant than implementing a politically-favored policy and reforms
sustained are subject to future frustration.. ' ..4 Some elected courts, specifically
those with partisan election procedures, have sustained even greater criticism. For
example, "[t]he Illinois Supreme Court, selected as a result of partisan election, has
garnered criticism from [the] left and right alike, for anti-intellectualism, for being
an embarrassment, and for producing unpredictable decisions which are rarely cited
elsewhere for the force of their logic or the power of their insight.""' 5
While scholars are divided on the issue of which method is better, the goal of
straying from elections for the purpose of achieving judicial independence is
widespread. One commentator noted: "Independent judges are better able to follow
the Constitution and the laws in making their decisions, and they face far less
pressure to conform their opinions with those of the political majority."'" 6 While
proponents ofjudicial elections claim that judges elected through that system will
do a "good, fair job," some of the justifications behind that system are not
consistent with the goals of the judiciary."' The idea that "[e]lections make state
trial judges more sensitive to how people, including lawyers, are treated in the
courts"' has never been, nor should it ever be, a guiding principle of the American
judiciary, while judicial independence has. It is a fundamental principle that
systems other than popular elections provide the best means of ensuring judicial
independence.
IV. AFTERMATH OF THE WHITE DECISION
Undoubtedly, the decision in White will have a major impact on the state
judicial system, but how far this decision will extend is still unclear. There is some
indication, based on recent decisions, that White has begun a slippery slope by
lessening restrictions on judicial candidate speech. Since the opinion was handed
down in June 2002, a number of courts, including the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals," 9 district courts in New York12 and Texas,' 2 ' and the supreme courts of
"4 Federalist Society, supra note 44, at 391-92.
.. Id. at 389 (citations omitted).
116 Fabian, supra note 18, at 175.
1' Aldrich, supra note 44, at 27.
118 Id.
" See Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312 (Ga. 2002).
1o See Spargo v. N.Y. State Comm'n on Judicial Conduct, 244 F. Supp. 2d 72 (N.D.
2003).
121 See Smith v. Phillips, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14913 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 5, 2002),
dismissed.
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Florida'2 and Pennsylvania, 23 have followed the decision with little sign of
meaningful resistance. The trend toward unlimited judicial candidate speech has
begun. "White was a ticking time bomb waiting to go off.... Now it has."'
124
Two states that currently utilize election as the preferred method of judicial
selection have necessarily altered their respective codes ofjudicial conduct in direct
response to the decision. In November of 2002, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
ordered Canon 7B(l)(C) of the Code of Judicial Conduct amended for the purpose
of removing a Clause essentially similar to the Announce Clause in White. 2 ' The
canon previously included the statement: "A candidate . . . should not .. .
announce his views on disputed legal or political issues."'2 It is interesting to note
that this court kept the remainder of the canon intact, allowing a prohibition on
pledges and promises as well as statements that commit the candidate with respect
to cases, narrowly construing the Court's holding and acknowledging the
importance of speech restrictions.' 7
Other courts have taken larger steps to remove limitations on judicial candidate
speech. A Texas district court struck down an entire section of the Code of Judical
Conduct in that state which read: "[A] . . . judicial candidate shall not make
statements that indicate an opinion on any issue that may be subject to judicial
interpretation by the office which is being sought or held, except.., if conducted
in a manner which does not suggest ... a probable decision on any particular
case." "'28 The Texas court appeared eager to find this provision unconstitutional
despite the comparatively less restrictive nature of Texas's Clause.2 9 Judge James
R. Nowlin held the provision to be analogous to Minnesota's Announce Clause,
arriving at this holding with but a paragraph of analysis, and subsequently dismissed
the case. 31 Clearly, the Texas judge felt that the Supreme Court had arrived at the
correct decision.
The decision in Texas appears to echo the sentiment that is present throughout
the federal court system. Two recent federal court opinions from the New York
District Court and the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals delve far deeper in their
analysis of the White decision, and both agree that the case was decided correctly.
Further, both courts appear to have expanded the holding.
122 See Inquiry Concerning a Judge (Kinsey), 842 So.2d 77 (Fla. 2003).
" See In re Amendment of Canon 7B(1)(c) of the Code of Judicial Conduct, 2002 Pa.
LEXIS 3194 (Pa. Nov. 21,2002) [hereinafter Amendment].
124 Adam Lipak, Judges Mix with Politics, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2003, at B 1 (quoting Geri
Palast, Executive Director of Justice at Stake).
"2 Amendment, supra note 123, at 3194.
126 PA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7B(1)(c) (2001).
127 id.
12' TEX. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(1) (2002).
129 Smith v. Phillips, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14913 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 5, 2002), dismissed.
130 Id.
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In Spargo v. New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct, plaintiffThomas
Spargo filed suit alleging that charges brought against him under certain sections
of New York's Code of Judicial Conduct violated his constitutional rights by
placing an impermissible prior restraint on free speech and limiting his right to
engage in political activity.'3 ' The charges concerned conduct by Spargo when he
campaigned for a judicial election to a town court, while he served on that lower
court, and the period during his campaign for the New York Supreme Court seat for
the Third Judicial District of New York.' It is alleged that while campaigning for
the lower court, "Spargo offered items of value to induce votes on his behalf."''
These items, totaling $2,000, included "donuts... coffee... gasoline... rounds
of drinks," among other things. 34 While serving on the lower court, during the
period before he became a candidate for state supreme court, he "participated in a
loud and obstructive demonstration against the recount process""' in the Bush v.
Gore election controversy. 36 Additionally, while campaigning for the state
supreme court, he attended and was the keynote speaker at the Monroe County
Conservative Party Dinner.'
Whether Spargo actually performed any of these acts, the court deemed
irrelevant; relying heavily on the White decision, the court held that the statutes
under which the charges were filed were unconstitutional. The statutes in question,
sections 100.5(A)(1)(c)-(g) and 100.5(A)(4)(a) of the New York Code of Judicial
Conduct generally stated that a candidate for judicial office shall refrain from
associating with partisan political activities and organizations. 3 ' They essentially
prohibited a judicial candidate from any political activity save his own campaign. "'
The state claimed an interest in protecting the independence - as distinguished
from impartiality - of the judiciary and, while this was accepted as a compelling
state interest, the court did not believe that the statutes were narrowly tailored to
serve this purpose."O The potential threats posed by the strong political
participation of judicial candidates, such as bias and the lack of judicial
independence, simply did not concern this court. Voluntary recusal was cited as the
preferred method of dealing with the harms of political participation."' This case
indicates what could be a dangerous trend following the White decision. If White
1, 244 F. Supp. 2d 72 (N.D. 2003).
132 Id. at 79-81.
' Id. at 79.
13 Id.
.3 Id at 80.
136 id.
117 Id. at 80-81.
138 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. &REGS. tit. 22, §§ 100. 1-100.5 (2003).
139 Spargo, 244 F. Supp. 2d at 88.
140 Id. at 87-88.
141 Id. at 88-89.
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continues to be read broadly, the level of political participation and control in the
judiciary could reach epidemic status.
While the holding in Spargo slightly extended White, the court in Weaver v.
Bonner completely recharacterized the decision. 4" As the discussion below
demonstrates, thoughtful reading of Weaver suggests that the concept of an
impartial and independent judiciary cannot exist ifjudges remain elected officials.
Weaver clearly demonstrates the dangers of a liberal reading of the White decision,
and provides further support for the need to alter state judicial selection procedures
in the decision's wake.
George Weaver, a former candidate for the Georgia Supreme Court, brought
suit alleging that sections of the Georgia Code of Judicial Conduct
unconstitutionally interfered with his right to free speech. '43 The suit was filed after
Georgia's Judicial Quality Commission disciplined Weaver for participating in
"intentionally deceptive campaign practices."'" During his campaign, Mr. Weaver
distributed pamphlets and appeared in television commercials that attacked his
opponent's views on same-sex marriage as well as the death penalty. 45 These
advertisements contained false, misleading information that the Judicial
Qualifications Commission deemed had been committed "intentionally and
blatantly" in violation of statute. ' At the time, judicial candidates were prohibited
by statute from making negligent false statements or misleading or deceptive true
statements to the public and soliciting campaign funds.'47 The Eleventh Circuit
struck down the statutory prohibitions that regulated both issues.
While the decision to hold these statutes unconstitutional appears problematic,
the reasoning behind the Eleventh Circuit's decision is striking. In comparing this
case to White, the court stated, "[W]e believe that the Supreme Court's decision in
White suggests that the standard for judicial elections should be the same as a
142 309 F.3d 1312 (Ga. 2002).
143 Id. at 1317.
144 Id.
141 Id. at 1316-17.
'46 Id. at 1317. Judge Weaver's pamphlets included statements about his opponent such
as: "She would require the State to license same-sex marriages;" "She has referred to
traditional moral standards as pathetic and disgraceful;" and that "[she] has called the electric
chair silly." Id. at 1316. His television commercials also contained striking allegations such
as: "What does Justice Sears stand for? Same-Sex Marriage" and "She's questioned the
constitutionality of laws prohibiting sex with children under fourteen." Id. at 1317.
147 Id. at 1315. See GA. CODEOF JUDICIALCONDUCT Canon 7B(l)(d) (2003) (stating that
candidates "shall not use or participate in the use of any form of public communication which
the candidate knows or reasonably should know is false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive,
or which contains a material misrepresentation of fact or law or omits a fact"); GA. CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7B(2) (2003) (providing that judicial candidates "shall not
themselves solicit campaign funds, or solicit publicly stated support").
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standard for legislative and executive elections."' 48 Building off of that assertion,
the court repeatedly cited cases concerning the restriction of speech in pure political
election situations to support its holding.' 49
Refusing to differentiate between political and judicial elections allowed this
court to draw from a breadth of sources with more stringent requirements for
governments seeking to restrict candidate speech. On this basis, the court reasoned
that the canon is "facially unconstitutional because it 'chill[ed]' core political
speech and violated the overbreadth doctrine prohibiting false statements of fact
made without knowledge or reckless disregard for falsity."'5° Because "erroneous
statement[s] [are] inevitable in free debate,"'' "breathing space" is required to
protect speech. ' Now, in addition to pure political campaigning, the
misrepresentations of judicial candidates will also be protected! The Eleventh
Circuit, at the very least, adopted the comparatively lenient "actual malice standard
... for regulations of candidate speech during judicial campaigns."''
The reasoning behind the court's ruling on the solicitation provision was
equally stunning. As impartiality concerns are raised by the entire process of
electing judges, preventing candidates from actively soliciting donations did not
further serve Georgia's compelling interest." The court opined that
"[c]ampaigning for elected office necessarily entails raising campaign funds and
seeking endorsements from prominent figures .... The opinion in this case
revealed why the decision in White is so problematic. If campaign speech for
judicial candidates cannot be restricted, the branch necessarily becomes politically
charged. The court in Weaver refused to recognize this point, stating that the
solicitation of"financial support and public endorsements... does not suggest that
[judges] will be partial if they are elected."'' Ifjudges desire reelection, however,
it is necessary that they serve their supporters. If elections are the preferred method
of judicial selection in states, lowering the bar to protect free speech of candidates
does nothing more than detract from the credibility of the judicial branch, while
running the risk of neglecting impartiality as a legitimate concern.
One state court did show some resistance to White, narrowly construing the
holding by acknowledging its limitations.'57 County Court Judge Patricia Kinsey
"I Weaver, 309 F.3d at 1321.
'.. Id. at 1321-23 (citing Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45 (1982); Butler v. Ala. Judicial
Inquiry Comm'n, 802 So.2d 207 (Ala. 2001); In re Chmura, 608 N.W.2d 31 (2000)).
so Id. at 1318.
"I Id. at 1319.
152 id.
15 Id. at 1321.
14 Id. at 1322.
15s Id.
156 Id.
" See Inquiry Concerning a Judge (Kinsey), 842 So.2d 77 (Fla. 2003).
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was charged with eleven violations of the Florida Code of Judicial Conduct, arising
from a campaign during which she ran on a platform that stressed a lack of
impartiality. 5 8 Judge Kinsey repeatedly advertised that she would strongly support
law enforcement and be tough on crime."' These types of statements were
regulated by statutory provisions similar to those found in Minnesota's Announce
Clause.
Speech restrictions forjudicial candidates in Florida are governed by Canon 7A
of the Florida Code of Judicial Conduct that states, "[C]andidate[s] for. . . judicial
office shall not.., make pledges or promises... [or] make statements that commit
. . . the candidate with respect to ... issues that are likely to come before the
court."'"6 In deciding this case, the Florida Supreme Court distinguished the
wording of the Code provision from the wording in the Announce Clause in White
and allowed protective speech restrictions enacted by the Florida legislature to
remain active. 161 While the Minnesota Announce Clause prohibited speech on
particular issues, the Florida Clause prohibits speech that would reveal a bias
toward particular parties. 6
2
While facially similar, the absence of an express Announce Clause allowed this
court to hold that the provisions enacted in Florida comprised a more narrow canon.
The court, which clearly supported speech restrictions, had strong opinions
concerning the function they serve. "It is beyond dispute that Canon
7A(3)(d)(i)-(ii) serves a compelling state interest in preserving the integrity of the
judiciary and maintaining the public's confidence in an impartial judiciary."' 63 The
court held that Florida's provisions were "narrowly tailored to protect the state's
compelling interests.... ."" Clearly, speech that reveals bias toward a particular
party compromises the impartiality (or at least the appearance of impartiality) of the
judiciary, and must be restricted.
In the end, however, the court's support of the Judicial Code proved toothless.
County Court Judge Patricia Kinsey was found guilty of eight violations of the
statute, but, while her statements clearly revealed a bias against alleged criminals,
she was reprimanded with merely a fine.'65 The Florida Supreme Court took a
positive step in upholding the statute; however, speech restrictions on judicial
candidates cannot achieve their desired goal unless courts are also willing to
158 Id.
"9 Id. at 80-85. Examples of her partial speech include statements such as "police officers
expect judges to take their testimony seriously and to help law enforcement by putting
criminals where they belong... behind bars!" Id. at 80.
160 FLA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7A(3)(d)(i)-(ii) (2003).
161 Kinsey, 842 So.2d at 80-85.
162 Id. at 86.
"' Id. at 87.
1' Id.
"' Id. at 92-93.
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properly punish violators. If restrictions onjudicial campaign speech are upheld but
not enforced, the restrictions serve no practical purpose; it is the same as having no
restrictions at all.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
If the slippery slope continues and the decision in White has the effect of
erasing the distinction between political and judicial elections, changes must be
made. There are recommendations that can be made with respect to the way in
which judges are selected at the state level. In the broadest sense, judicial selection
procedures must be modified to reflect the true role of the judiciary and to lessen
the increasing effects of politicization.
Most importantly, the issue ofjudicial elections must be thoroughly examined.
While the possibility of preventing states from using elections as their method of
judicial selection is unclear, 66 changes to the election process can be made to
increase judicial independence, and preserve judicial impartiality. Most obviously,
partisan judicial elections, the most blatant way in which politics can jeopardize the
independence of the judicial branch, must be stopped. Judicial candidates should
not be required to raise and provide funding for their own campaigns; this would
prevent the influence of political parties and special interest groups. Methods have
been suggested that would help to alleviate both of these problems, and states must
afford these alternate methods of selection serious consideration.
One viable method of achieving the goals of independence and impartiality is
through the process of merit selection, the preferred method ofjudicial selection of
the American Judicature Society.'67 "Merit selection is a way of choosing judges
that uses a nonpartisan commission of lawyers and non-lawyers to locate, recruit,
investigate and evaluate applicants forjudgeships."' 68 The commission then selects
three candidates for submission to the governor, who has the responsibility of
making the final selection.'69 After serving for a predetermined term, the judge
retains his seat through an uncontested retention election.17 This method has the
result of placing the most qualified candidates into office while removing the
political influence present in judicial elections.' 7' Arizona has used this method
16 States have the right to select their own method of judicial selection, and have been
doing so since 1812. LARRY C. BERKSON & SETH ANDERSON, AM. JUDICATURE SOc'Y,
JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE UNITED STATES: A SPECIAL REPORT (1999), available at
http://www.ajs.org/selection/berkson.pdf.
167 AM. JUDICATURE SOC'Y, MERIT SELECTION: THE BEST WAY TO CHOOSE THE BEST
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since 1974 and the "mature solid system for selecting judges" has resulted in a
"strong and independent judiciary" in that state.17 2
Regardless of the current method a state uses, it is imperative that states
examine alternative methods ofjudicial selection. Even in states that do not utilize
the election method of judicial selection, there are changes that can be made to the
nomination/confirmation process that stresses greater bipartisan participation and
merit selection. The same problems present in the federal system also plague the
states that have selected the method of judicial appointments. The influence of
political parties must be lessened in this process as well.
John Ferejohn suggests that a popular European format, "requiring a
supermajority in the Senate for appointments and limiting justices to a single
nonrenewable term,"'73 might help to lessen the political influence on the
judiciary. 74 "It is doubtful that American judges protected by life tenure and
chosen in partisan political processes can be relied upon to exercise precisely the
kinds of nuanced restraint that would be called for."'7 Removing politics from the
appointment process and setting term limits would allow judges to conduct their
duties more independently. Additionally, "[tihis would tend to discourage the
appointment of ideologically extreme judges,"'7 a problem that currently plagues
the appointment process. The appointment of extreme judges lends strength to the
argument that the judiciary is increasingly performing a legislative function.
Limiting the appointment of these types of judges would promote consensus
building, leading to the reestablishment of confidence in the courts.' 7 Whereas
merit selection (as an alternative to judicial elections) concentrates on removing the
political influence on individual judicial candidates, supermajority appointment
concentrates on removing the political influence from the process as a whole.
Additionally, judges must take a vested interest in the legitimacy of the branch.
Even if judicial speech cannot be restricted through constitutional means, judges
campaigning and serving in states where elections govern judicial selection must
take it upon themselves, from a normative standpoint, to restrict speech for the
purpose of salvaging the appearance of impartiality.' Judges must conduct
themselves in the manner that the founders intended. The era of politically-
motivated judicial activism must end. "If you put on the black sheet, you have
withdrawn your right to talk about politics and indeed to think about politics."' 79
172 Wallwork, supra note 17, at 6.
'3 See Ferejohn, supra note 15, at 66.
174 Id.
175 Id.
176 Id. at 67.
177 id.
17' Berness, supra note 64.
17' Lipak, supra note 124 at B1 (quoting Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.).
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
VI. CONCLUSION
The American judiciary has become increasingly politicized in recent decades
and unless states respond by slowing this trend, America runs the risk of completely
deviating from the initial purpose of the branch. The Framers created the judiciary
as the weakest and most impartial of the three branches, designing it to have little
impact on the way that the country was run."'8 However, in past decades and
certainly in the wake of the White decision, the entire concept of the judiciary, at
least in states where election is the method of judicial selection, has changed.
Political influence in the judiciary is rapidly increasing with no signs of relent.
In making it more difficult for states to restrict the speech of political
candidates, the White decision clearly opened the door for an eventual abolishment
of all meaningful legislative restrictions. This danger was revealed in Weaver v.
Bonner, which held that judicial and political elections should be governed by the
same principles.'8 ' Courts no longer recognize that, due to the nature of the office
sought, judicial and political elections are fundamentally different and should be
treated as such. The White ruling reduces judges to common politicians, clearly
damaging the appearance of an impartial judiciary. This was not the intention of
the Framers!
While the White decision and its aftermath are problematic, the fundamental
issue might not lie in speech restrictions for judicial candidates, but rather with the
decision of states to make judges elected officials. Justice O'Connor, in her
concurring opinion in White, addressed this point: "If a state has a problem with
judicial impartiality, it is largely one the State brought upon itself by continuing the
practice of popularly electing judges.' 8 2 If states continue to select judges through
popular election, this ruling allows the system to be completely compromised.
States must modify judicial selection procedures to reflect the true role of the
judiciary and to lessen the increasing effects of politicization.
Brendan H. Chandonnet
'go See supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text.
"' 309 F.3d 1312, 1321 (Ga. 2002).
2 Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 792 (2002) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
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